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Background: The shrinkage of working age population at ages between 15 and 59
after 2010 will end the era of the high-speed economic growth in China. This paper
is intended to explore the ways of tackling this slowdown.
Methods: By revealing annual growth rate of potential output to drop to 7.2 % in
2011–2015 and 6.1 % in 2016–2020, this paper is to explain the cause of growth rate
deceleration and draw policy implications of such slowdown.
Results: First, the government should not seek a growth rate above potential rate if
they do not intend to see distortions in the economy such as macroeconomic instability,
overcapacity, deviation from comparative advantage, and protection of inefficient firms.
Second, the potential growth rate can be strengthened through institutions building
and reorientation of public policy in various areas in order to spur labor mobility and
productivity improvement.
Conclusions: This paper suggests to deepen economic reform in order to sustain the
necessarily high growth rate of the Chinese economy.
Keywords: Potential growth rate; Diminishing return to capital; Total factor
productivity (TFP)Background
During the period of dual economy, China’s economic growth has been characterized
by an unlimited supply of labor, which has helped to contain the rates of diminishing
returns on capital. The demographic dividends lead to increased rates of savings, which
in turn translated into growth in investment, ensuring ample supply of production fac-
tors. Massive flow of labor from agriculture to other industries has improved resource
reallocation efficiency, and it now constitutes the main determinant of total factor
productivity (TFP). Improvements in microeconomic incentive mechanism have in-
creased technological efficiency. The wide technology gap between China and devel-
oped nations has actually benefited China via a learning process and the introduction
of foreign direct investment (FDI). Through systemic reform and opening up to the
outside world, China has maintained a high potential growth rate to which the actual
one has been very close over the past 30 plus years.
As the working-age population (15–64) is growing at a diminishing rate and is pre-
dicted to peak in 2013, there will be a substantial reduction of agricultural surplus
labor. This will in turn change the nature of the development of China’s dual economy.2015 Cai. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (http://
reativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the
riginal work is properly credited.
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other words, labor shortages will become common, which will cause diminishing returns
on capital and shrink the window of opportunity for resource reallocation between agri-
culture and other industries. Not only will future economic growth be restrained by factor
inputs but the potential improvement of TFP will also be reduced, causing the potential
growth rate to slow down accordingly.
In response to possible slowdown of the potential growth rate, authorities will have a
number of options. They may spare no effort to achieve a real growth rate higher than
the potential growth rate or they may change the potential growth rate via policies.
Either option will generate different results of economic results.
As is depicted in Fig. 1, two policy measures can be employed to tackle the slowdown
of potential growth rate, each with different consequences. According to the current
long-term aggregate supply curve S1, more total output requires extremely high total
costs. As is displayed in the figure, when the output level expands from O0 to O1, the
total cost will rise from C0 to C2. With respect to the scope of the concept of total cost,
one can see that it should be rather expansive, including not only the cost of the add-
itional material input need to generate larger output but also the costs in terms of
macroeconomic conditions such as inflation, resource consumption, and environmental
pollution, and of other adverse market conditions associated with growth policies such
as price distortion, poor resource allocative efficiency, and excess capacity. It is clear,
therefore, that it can be rather dangerous to pursue a real growth rate higher than the
potential growth rate.
A common mistake in macroeconomic analysis that may potentially lead to misguided
policies is to confuse demand factors of economic growth with supply factors. As far as
the potential growth rate is concerned, demand factors can only influence the difference,
i.e., growth gap, between the real growth rate and the potential growth rate. A strong
short-term demand can push the real growth rate beyond potential growth capacity, while
inadequate demand can cause real growth to fall short of potential growth capacity. How-
ever, the potential of economic growth ultimately depends on the potential growth rate,Fig. 1 Prices paid for growth under different long-term aggregate supply curves
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without an increase to the potential growth rate, expanding demand arbitrarily in order to
spur economic growth may cause real economic growth to exceed the potential growth
rate, which may also lead to distortion.
The potential growth rate of an economy is, however, changeable. For example, if
price incentives are increased and the institutional environment is improved, the supply
of relevant production factors may rise. In addition, the improvement of incentive
mechanisms can also promote productivity gains. As shown in Fig. 1, if the long-term
aggregate supply curve expands from S1 to S2, the same growth of total output (from
O0 to O1) can be achieved at a much lower total cost (only with a rise from C0 to C1).
In other words, changing the potential growth rate can result in higher economic
growth rate without causing any distortion or damage to the macro economy.
This paper makes reference to some estimates for China’s potential growth rate in
order to explain the inevitability of its slowdown. We hope to show that the pursuit of
a real rate of growth higher than the potential one by means of various distorted policies
inevitably causes macroeconomic instability, thereby aggravating existing imbalances in
the economic growth, and hindering the transformation of the mode of economic devel-
opment in China. International experience teaches us that, however, these kinds of
growth-promoting policies are in fact self-defeating.
This paper will attempt to demonstrate the plasticity of the potential growth rate.
Better institutions and public policy will allow us to improve factor input, resource use
efficiency, TFP, and so forth, which may increase potential growth rate, and create the
conditions for higher real growth rate.Methods
Slowing of the potential growth rate
The determining factors for the potential growth rate basically consist of labor supply,
capital supply, and TFP. Production input and the sources of productivity are different
for different stages of economic development. Since the launch of reform and opening-
up policy in 1978, and until 2004, China was a typical dual economy. In 2004, China
entered a period of transition from a dual economy toward one characterized by neo-
classical growth. The key determinant of the potential growth rate is the change in
labor supply. When the labor supply is unlimited, diminishing return on capital, which
is typical of neoclassical growth, is insignificant, meaning that cumulative growth of
production factors suffice to sustain growth. Moreover, the flow of labor force from the
agricultural sector to other industries can create resource reallocation efficiency, thus
laying a foundation for TFP improvement, which is necessary for rapid economic
growth. As a result, once the labor supply is no longer unlimited, the abovementioned
conditions will undergo a fundamental change such that the slowdown of the potential
growth rate is inevitable.
Demographic structure and economic growth rate can affect the absorption rate of
surplus labor, and changes to the supply–demand relation in the market happen only
gradually. The Lewis turning point has already been reached in China, as the growth
rate of labor demand has exceeded that of labor supply, resulting in labor shortages
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another turning point was reached, namely the demographic dividend turning point
marked by the peaking of working-age population and the bottoming-out of the popu-
lation dependency ratio.
According to research conducted by Japanese scholars, Japan reached the Lewis turn-
ing point in the early 1960s (Minami 1968), and if we take the start of the dependency
ratio increase as signaling the turning point at which the demographic dividend dissi-
pates, this was reached in Japan in 1990. The interval between these two turning points
was about 30 years. Studies by South Korean researcher indicate that South Korea
reached the Lewis turning point in 1972 (Bai 1982) and will not reach its demographic
dividend turning point until 2013 or about 40 years later. In the case of China, the two
points will be only 9 years apart if 2004 is regarded as the year of the Lewis turning
point and 2013 as the year (when the dependency ratio will start to increase) of the
demographic dividend turning point (see Fig. 2).
In terms of the demographic dividend turning point—that is, the bottoming-out and
the imminent rise of the population dependency ratio and its impact on the potential
growth rate—the situation in China now shares many similarities with the Japanese
situation in 1970 and 1990. In 1970, Japan’s dependency ratio fell to its lowest point,
where it stayed until 1990. Since then, it has increased precipitously. Correspondingly,
the potential growth rate of the Japanese economy slowed down significantly (Ikeda
2012, p. 6). Hereafter, whether its real growth rate is higher or lower than its potential
growth rate, forming either a positive or negative output gap, Japan’s real growth rate
can do no more than hovering around its potential growth rate (Amornthum 2002). In
fact, Japan’s average annual real GDP growth rate fell significantly, down to 3.8 %
between 1970 and 1990 from 9.2 % between 1950 and 1970, after which the Japanese
economy entered a period of stagnation with an average annual real GDP growth rate
of 0.85 % between 1990 and 2010.
Using the growth account method, scholars have both estimated China’s potential
GDP growth rate between 1978 and 2009 and predicted the rate between 2010 and
2020,1 and the results are quite close. For example, according to the estimates by KuijsFig. 2 Time spans between two turning points: Japan, South Korea, and China. Source: United Nations (2011)
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1994 and 9.6 % between 1995 and 2009 and is estimated to be 8.4 % between 2010
and 2015 and 7.0 % between 2016 and 2020. The estimate by Lu (2012) is relatively
pessimistic—that is, while China reached its average annual potential GDP growth
rate of 10.39 % between 1978 and 1994 and 9.76 % between 1995 and 2009, it is
estimated to drop to 7.79 % during the period of the 12th Five-Year Plan and drop
further to 6.31 % during the period of the 13th Five-Year Plan (see Fig. 3).
Because demographic transition in China has been much faster than observers could
have predicted, it stands to reason that the aforementioned forecasts may still be an over-
estimation of China’s potential GDP growth rate. According to a widely known estimate,
the 15–64-year-old working-age population in China is expected to stop growing in 2013
and begins to decline afterward. The reversal of the dependency ratio is also predicted to
occur in the same year. According to the sixth national census conducted in 2010, however,
the population aged 15–59 years old already stopped growing in 2010 because of low long-
term fertility levels (China Development Research Foundation 2012, Chapter 10).2 As a
result, labor supply constraints may be much more serious than is commonly thought.
Similarly, since it is difficult to assess the severity of diminishing returns on capital
accurately, most predictions will be based on an overestimation of capital supply poten-
tials. More importantly, with the substantial reduction in surplus labor in agriculture, it
will now be impossible to achieve resource reallocation efficiency as easily as in the
past. Also, the technology gap between China and developed nations has been narrow-
ing gradually, which has pared down on what relative advantage China used to be able
to claim on the basis of its backwardness. This is making continued technological pro-
gress and future growth both increasingly difficult. All this can lead to a significant
slowdown to the growth of TFP.
Results and discussion
High costs of pursuing high growth rates
If the Chinese government, at either the central or the local level, will not accept the
slowdown of the potential growth rate, it would need to establish leverages in order toFig. 3 Estimate of China’s potential growth rate of GDP. Source: Lu (2012)
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than the potential growth rate. They may achieve this by instituting industrial policies
aimed at seeking dynamic comparative advantages, regional development strategies
focused on fostering new economic growth points, and stimulus packages targeted at
maintaining a higher growth rate. As international experience has demonstrated, how-
ever, high growth rates achieved in this way can undermine sustainable growth.
First, the pursuit of excessively high growth rates by means of frequent macroeco-
nomic regulations will invariably lead to macroeconomic instability and damage the
climate in which small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) operate and grow. Stimulus
policies are intended to pursue a real growth rate higher than the potential growth rate,
which can introduce volatility into the macroeconomy and also aggravate existing imbal-
ances within the economy. Apart from the potential risks of the bubble economy, the
introduction of tightening policies due to concerns about inflation following stimulus
policies often harms SMEs, because large state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and state
investment projects are usually protected, while SMEs become the sole targets of
regulation. The regulatory process itself will inevitably lead both SMEs and the
private economy to become the first casualty even in the absence of overt policy
discrimination against them.
For example, during periods of tightened monetary supply when reserve ratio and
benchmark interest rate are raised, bank loans are usually directly controlled through
“window guidance” designed to protect only those healthy and sustainable investments.
However, in the implementation of “window guidance,” local branches of commercial
banks tend to protect large SOEs and state investment projects and to apply pressure
to SMEs and private projects. This is because the former has government guarantees
and risk-free soft budget constraints and as such need not be concerned with their abil-
ity to repay the loans, but the latter can only rely on competition to survive. In this
case, SMEs will tend to face more stringent financial constraints than large enterprises.
At the new development stage, the increase of productivity relies overwhelmingly on
the ability of SMEs to innovate. Macroeconomic instability and the negative impacts on
SMEs associated with it can hinder the improvement of TFP, thereby hampering the
economic growth rate.
Second, pursuing excessively high growth rates will lead to prices distortions for pro-
duction factors and compromise comparative advantages. Strenuous promotion of large-
scale investment means too much investment of cheap capital, which drives down the
relative price of capital, resulting in increased capital intensity, which not only detracts
from China’s comparative advantages but also aggravates diminishing returns on capital.
For example, the capital–labor ratio of the manufacturing industry in China’s central
and western regions has undergone a rapid upward trend after 2000, with a growth rate
higher than that in coastal regions. After climbing rapidly in 2003 and 2004, the abso-
lute level of capital intensity in the central and western regions has been higher than
that in the coastal regions. In 2007, the capital–labor ratio of manufacturing was
20.1 % in the central provinces and 25.9 % in the western provinces, both higher than
in the eastern regions. In other words, while the central and western regions do not
enjoy comparative advantages in capital-intensive industries, manufacturing in those re-
gions has become more capital intensive, and the heavy and chemical industries in
those regions have grown considerably.
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growth rate falls, that is, as the demographic dividend diminishes, the Chinese economy
can no longer be said to enjoy unlimited labor supply. Instead, the Chinese economy is
increasingly in characteristic of neoclassical growth, and the increase of capital invest-
ment has already run up against diminishing returns on capital. This can be observed
in the precipitous fall of the rates of marginal return for capital, as well as the acceler-
ated growth of capital investment (see Fig. 4).
Third, the pursuit of excessively high growth rates will lead to resource wastage and
will aggravate excess capacity. Investment behaviors originating from factors extrinsic
to the market can easily lead to resource malallocation and lower investment efficiency,
which will result in excess capacity. For countries playing catch-up, and especially when
they are speeding up with respect to gains in comparative advantages, it is not unusual
for their governments to intervene directly in investment activities in order to discover
which sectors and regions possess potential competitive advantages and to seize growth
opportunities. As seen in China, such government intervention may be manifested in a
series of government strategies and policies. On the whole, emerging strategic industries
with comparative advantages that the government has chosen to give strong support
usually involve large-scale investment, long construction cycles and are technologically
exploratory and experimental. Once their preferential status is established, investment
and construction may experience a surge.
Historical experience indicates that the main objective of developing nations when
they are working toward catching up with developed nations is achieving a certain in-
dustrial structure. That is to say, when forecasting their own dynamic comparative advan-
tages, enterprises tend to take the development of certain capital- and technology-
intensive industries as a means for catching-up. When both enterprises and investors
predict high comparative advantage, an investment surge follows (Lin 2007). When
the government intervenes in investment activities, the scale of government invest-
ment and its guiding investment philosophy may be loaded with a variety of prefer-
ences, and even large subsidies. This may lead to an enlargement effect, which leads
the investment to flock toward the same direction or the same region.Fig. 4 Marginal return to capital and capital–labor ratio. Source: Cai and Zhao (2012)
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resolve the problem of excess capacity and repetitive construction projects on one hand
while creating excess capacity by implementing industrial policies ostensibly aimed at
improving infrastructure regional development strategies, industrial revitalization, and
development of strategic emerging industries on the other.
Not surprisingly, due to the recent wave of investment, those industries targeted by
industrial policies and regional development strategies as leading industries often suffer
the most severe excess capacity. In 2010, with the exception of some industries that are
internationally competitive, such as the textile industry and light industry, the utilization
rate of production capacity of most targeted industries was significantly lower than the
average rate of industrial production capacity utilization (82 %). Of those, the production
capacity utilization rate was less than 50 % in the steel industry and 70 % in the non-
ferrous metal industry (Qu 2012).
Finally, pursuing an excessively high growth rate will lead to overprotection of ineffi-
cient enterprises and hinder the improvement of TFP. In the name of securing employ-
ment and maintaining GDP growth and tax revenue, those enterprises which should
have been eliminated due to poor performance are subsidized and protected from
collapse. This practice will result in saving underperforming production capacity,
damaging competition mechanisms, and creating zombie enterprises.
China still has an advantage in the backwardness of its economic development. In
many fields, such as systemic reform, increase of management efficiency, and applica-
tion of new technologies, there are still some low-hanging fruits to harvest so as to im-
prove significantly microeconomic production efficiency. To obtain such efficiency, and
to maintain sustainable growth, China should promote innovation within enterprises,
which should choose their own management methods and technological routes so as to
maximize efficiency. However, that would require the government to exercise restraints
in micro-management of the economy.
There is an ancient Chinese saying that, “there is no construction without destruction,
no flowing without damming and no motion without rest”. This is essentially a reference
to the phenomenon of creative destruction such as discussed by Joseph Schumpeter.
What it means is that new economic structures are built from the rubble of older ones.
Without an environment of creative destruction, inefficient enterprises will not die and
efficient ones would not come into being. Without the dominant role of TFP, economic
growth cannot be sustained in the environment closer to the neoclassical scenario.
Tapping new sources of economic growth
The aforementioned points demonstrate that economic transition in China from one
development stage to the next is going to slow down growth. Therefore, it would be
improper to implement policies intended to achieve by arbitrary means growth rates
that are higher than the potential growth rate, because that would in many cases hurt
long-term sustainability of the economy. It is necessary, therefore, for policymakers to
be willing to accept constraints to the growth rate. However, the potential growth rate
can change, that is, it can be increased via tapping relevant factors of production, espe-
cially the potential labor supply, and improving TFP, so as to achieve a higher economic
growth rate. There is still a large window of opportunity for increasing the potential
growth rate of the Chinese economy through reform.
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trend in labor supply. As the working-age population stops growing, not only will the
labor supply itself restrict economic growth but more importantly, labor shortages will
generate diminishing returns on capital, which has exerted little constraint on Chinese
economic growth through the period of unlimited labor supply. Therefore, if the poten-
tial labor supply can be further developed and human capital significantly improved,
not only factor bottlenecks but also diminishing returns on capital will be mitigated.
In addition, as China’s economy increasingly tends toward neo-classical growth, long-
term sustainable growth will ultimately depend on the transition from input-driven
factors to TFP-driven patterns. Therefore, to increase the potential growth rate, it is
important for us to explore how to improve TFP.
First, there is still a huge potential for rural labor transfer. In general, increasing the
labor participation rate can increase the potential growth rate once labor has become a
constrained factor of economic growth (Cai and Lu 2012). For the next 5–10 years, to
further promote migration of rural laborers toward urban non-agricultural sectors in
order to stabilize the supply of labor is a distinctly Chinese way of improving the labor
participation rate. In 2010, China’s urbanization rate reached 49.95 %. However, the
population share of non-agricultural household registration, or hukou, accounted for
only 34.17 %. The difference between the two was mainly due to the fact that rural
laborers working in cities for over 6 months cannot obtain urban hukou.
The fact that the migrant workers seeking jobs in eastern cities are still registered as
permanent residents of the central and western rural areas means that they cannot live
in working areas permanently until they have reached a certain age, as per regulations
of the existing hukou system. Therefore, they usually have to return home to live the
life of a farmer upon reaching their late 30s or early 40s, which substantially decreases
the labor force participation rate.
The situation whereby migrant workers are counted as urban residents but cannot
obtain an urban hukou has led not only to unequal provision of urban public services
but also to instability in labor supply, as they comprise more than a third of the work-
force in urban areas. Therefore, as labor-intensive industries are increasingly relocated
from coastal regions to central and western regions, the provision of full access to pub-
lic services to migrant workers should be made a hukou system reform priority. This
reform can eliminate institutional barriers to rural labor mobility, expand the geographic
and industrial scope of the further transfer of rural labor, and increase the total labor
supply.
Second, the accumulation of human capital should be intensified. It is estimated
based on labor data that 1.3 years of schooling is required for a worker in a labor-
intensive secondary industry to transition into a capital-intensive secondary industry
and 4.2 years to transition into a technology-intensive tertiary industry. This is a long-
time investment for workers to bear. Even though the government extended the number
of years of compulsory education and increased enrollment in colleges and universities,
the average length of education of the population over 16 years old increased only from
6.24 to 7.56 years between 1990 and 2000, an increase of only 1.32 years. That figure was
up to 7.88 years in 2005, an increase of only 0.32 year over 5 years.
To facilitate a better education for future workers, it is necessary to maintain rapid
development of various types of education at all levels, including higher education. For
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creased the average duration of education of Chinese workers. As the rude enrollment
rate of compulsory education is now up to 100 %, it will be necessary to popularize
senior high school and higher education in order to continue to increase the figure.
Increased attendance of senior high school leads to higher enrollment in universities,
just as increased enrollment in universities promotes increased high school attendance.
The higher the attendance rate of the high schools, the greater the proportion of the
population that desires to enroll in colleges and universities. Conversely, when there
are more opportunities to enroll in colleges and universities, a larger percentage of the
population is motivated to enroll in high schools. At present, the government budget
for senior high school expenditures is comparatively low, which results in an overbur-
den on household expenditures, plus a high opportunity cost and a low passing rate on
the college entrance examination. So high school may in the future become a bottle-
neck for the development of education. Therefore, assuming the continued and rapid
popularization of higher education, the government should promote free high school
education. On the other hand, the government should encourage social investment and
family investment in higher education.
Finally, it is urgent to open up new areas of the economy to increase the TFP. At this
stage of a typical dual economy, simply transferring labor can bring about a huge prod-
uctivity spike, as there is surplus labor in agriculture and agricultural productivity is
significantly lower than in non-agricultural industries. This resource reallocation effi-
ciency gain has been an important driver of TFP growth over the past 30 years of
China’s economic development. As China has now reached the Lewis point and agricul-
tural labor surpluses are dwindling, large-scale labor transfers will inevitably slow
down. This will also change the process whereby TFP is improved.
Specifically, as shown in Fig. 5, as China’s economy transitions toward neo-classical
growth from the dual economy, the sources of TFP will shift from reallocation of re-
sources among the primary, secondary, and tertiary to reallocation within the secondaryFig. 5 Sources of productivity before and after the Lewis turning point
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among various enterprises.
The next 10 years will be a critical period for China as it tries to go from an upper-
middle income country to a high-income country. As compared to middle-income
countries with a per capita GDP of 6,000–12,000 USD, China still has huge potential
for transitioning its agricultural labor into industrial labor. By compiling the data for
several nations in similar developmental stages in 1997, we discovered that the average
proportion of agricultural labor in those nations was 14.8 %, nearly 20 percentage
points lower than officially reported figures and 10 percentage points lower than schol-
arly figures estimated in China.3 This means that in the next 10 years, China needs to
reduce its current agricultural labor population of 192 million by at least 2 million or
1 % annually. This would allow China to continue to improve in resource reallocation
efficiency and to make progress toward the sustainable economic growth.
However, as a period of neoclassical growth is coming—namely, less and less surplus
labor force in agriculture—resource reallocation efficiency among the primary, second-
ary, and tertiary industries will eventually recede. The following sources may improve
TFP more in the future. First, there are differentials in productivity between the sec-
ondary and tertiary industries; thus promoting the movement of production factors
toward subsectors with higher productivity can help to achieve higher resource reallo-
cation efficiency. Second, there are disparities in productivity among enterprises
within a sector, thus allowing the more efficient enterprises to mature, to expand their
scale and to dominate in the sector, while at the same time eliminating inefficiently
run enterprises. This will help raise the efficiency of the sector and of the economy
on the whole.
To achieve higher TFP by such means, it is necessary to lift the exit and entry bar-
riers in the industrial sectors and the institutional barriers to production factor mobil-
ity. It is also necessary to introduce competition mechanisms to enable enterprises that
perform well to prosper and those that perform poorly to be eliminated.Conclusions
As an economy’s potential growth rate slows, it is facile for officials to try to spur the
real GDP growth rate to a higher level than the potential growth rate by means of over-
arching industrial policies, regional development strategies, and stimulus policies, be-
cause they produce immediate effects and can be implemented by use of tangible tools.
It is thus tempting for the policymakers to adopt such policies frequently. Moreover,
enhancing the potential growth rate will rely mostly on deepening reforms across the
board in many fields. Since there is no longer any “low-hanging fruit” for reform, it will
be more difficult to make use of the old strategies.
As Kharas (2011) (known for coining the concept “Middle Income Trap”) points out,
it would take 10 years or more for the intended effects of reform to materialize, includ-
ing the development of a capital market, acceleration of innovation and development of
higher education, improvement of urban management, livable city construction, forma-
tion of the agglomeration effect, effective rule of law, separation of powers, and reduced
corruption. Therefore, the protracted nature of the reforms to potential growth rates
often leads the decision-makers to return to their tried and trusted economic tricks.
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term economic growth, one should not take a utilitarian view on reform. In other words,
one should not expect reforms to produce immediate effects on economic growth. On
one hand, it is necessary to push reforms to a new height to build institutional conditions
for long-term sustained growth. On the other, it is imperative to prepare to adapt to and
to accept reduced growth rates similar to those experienced during neo-classical growth,
which would be necessary for transition from the “low-hanging fruit” economic growth
pattern of quantity into a productivity-centric model focused on quality.
Endnotes
1For details of data and methods of the estimation, see Cai and Lu (2012) and Kuijs
(2009).
2Most scholars and United Nations’ official reports believe China’s total fertility rate
is about 1.4–1.5, while some argues that it has fallen to 1.18, based on census in 2010
(Mu 2012).
3It may be found that the total number of actual farm labor in China is 192 million,
accounting for 24.7 % of the total labor force, by classifying the labor inputs in different
economic activities of the rural labor force monthly and individually instead of classify-
ing the labor employment annually. (Du and Wang 2011).
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